Chapters

Introduction
Kansas-Nebraska Act
Seeds of Discontent
The 12th Confederate State
Missouri’s Provisional Union Government
Post War Politics

Sectional tensions were at an all time high in the months before the 1860 presidential election, as Southerners threatened secession and issues of slavery, popular sovereignty, and state’s rights were hotly debated. The central issue however, whether it was perceived as such, was the future of the United States. A whirlwind of activity took place between the election and the summer of 1861. Those ten short months spawned life changing events for so many peaceful Ozarks citizens and their families.

By 1860, one hundred thousand Kentuckians called Missouri their home, settling in the central region of Missouri with fertile lands for cultivation and invaluable waterways for transporting products to southern markets, and the rapidly growing city of St. Louis. Many of these emigrants lived the ideal agrarian life of Jeffersonian political thought.1 Most eloquently expressed by Thomas Jefferson, they were economic and political conservatives who believed America should be a nation of farmers. As staunch members of the Democratic Party, they had a great distrust of cities and industrialization, and argued that a virtuous life on the land was the true destiny of America. The fertile soil of the Missouri River Valley allowed for cash crops, especially hemp, to be cultivated. The combination of fertile soil and easy access to transportation made slavery profitable throughout the region. Ultimately, many of these western planters saw slavery as an essential component of democracy.2 But not all Missouri Democrats were farmers, as the party had many supporters among the businessmen of St. Louis. In the 1830s and 1840s, most Missourians claimed to be “Jacksonians” as they viewed Andrew Jackson to be the legitimate heir to the “throne” of Thomas Jefferson, but internal politics, centered around the degree to which many followed Jackson created a great split among Missourians. Issues such as railroad expansion, the development of a state bank, and tariffs were widely debated.

Meanwhile, St. Louis experienced a period of explosive growth. From 1832 to the 1850s the number of steamboats in St. Louis increased from 532 to more than three thousand.3 St. Louis saw an increase in German immigrants, and by 1850 one in three St. Louis residents were of German origin, compared to 7.2 percent for the rest of the state.4 As St. Louis expanded and became more diverse the city became increasingly alien to rural Missourians. Streets filled with merchants, various minorities, and developing industries resembled nothing of the traditional Southern cities, and instead bore a striking resemblance to the industrial cities of the North. The common man of rural Missouri, however, still saw their economic wealth come from hard work on the land rather than through industrialized labor as in part of the North.

By the 1850s, the number of German and Northern settlers in Missouri drastically outnumbered settlers from Southern states.5 Many Missourians with Southern heritage linked these Northerners with the Germans, which fueled more feelings of discontent and “invasion.” In some areas of Missouri the demographics of a Southern state had all but disappeared, and many feared their way of life would soon be lost.

Missouri confronted the pivotal 1860 presidential election with these changing demographics. The political landscape was so bitter that the Republican nominee, Abraham Lincoln did not appear on the ballot in most Southern states. Although vowing not to interfere with slavery in the South, Lincoln and the Republicans opposed its expansion into the western territories. The issue of slavery in the territories split the Democratic Party as southern delegates walked out of the party’s convention and nominated John C. Breckinridge, a staunch advocate of slavery and its expansion. Northern Democrats nominated Stephen A. Douglas, a moderate who wanted settlers to decide the slavery issue for themselves. This split ensured Lincoln’s victory, if only the railsplitter could carry all the Northern states. He did, and while nationally Lincoln was a minority president, he was the unanimous choice of the North. Douglas carried Missouri, significant evidence that its citizens rejected the extremists on both sides, but were still committed to protecting the rights of slaveowners.

Southern fireaters increased their secession rhetoric after Lincoln’s election. South Carolina became the first state to take the momentous step when it passed an Ordinance of Secession on December 20, 1860. Six weeks later, another six Southern states voted to secede. Secession conventions were called across the border-states, and Missouri’s was held three weeks after Lincoln’s inauguration.
Before the convention met, Missouri Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson declared:

As far as Missouri is concerned, her citizens have ever been devoted to the Union, and she will remain in it so long as there is any hope that it will maintain the spirit and guarantees of the Constitution. But if the Northern States have determined to put the slave-holding States on a footing of inequality… then they have themselves practically abandoned the Union, and will not expect our submission to a government on terms of inequality and subordination.6

Unionists controlled the convention however, and Missouri became the only state to hold a secession convention and then vote to remain in the Union. Still, the convention soundly rejected coercion along with secession. The delegates called for federal troops to be removed from southern forts, and they expressed support for slavery where it already existed.7

Though eager for Missouri to join the Confederacy, Governor Jackson quickly realized time was on his side. The convention made it clear Missouri would not accept harsh federal measures against any state. Thus, Missouri assumed the position of an armed neutral, committed to the Union, but ready to defend itself against federal abuses. Jackson clearly understood the election of 1860 and the secession convention were firm evidence Missourians did not want to leave the Union. But Jackson believed they would be soon, provided he did not push the issue. So, Jackson publically expressed Missouri’s neutrality and his readiness to defend the state; privately, he cooperated with Confederate officials and waited for federal forces to act. Missouri’s strategic location on the Mississippi River ensured this was almost inevitable.8

The weeks that followed were turbulent. Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina, was bombarded by Confederate artillery on April 12. On April 15, President Lincoln called for 75,000 militia volunteers to confront the rebellion. The president also called Congress into session. Missouri was requested to supply just over 3,000 men. Governor Jackson, famously replied, “Sir—Your requisition is illegal, unconstitutional and revolutionary; in its object inhuman & diabolical. Not one man will Missouri furnish to carry on any such unholy crusade against her Southern sisters.”9 Jackson’s posturing was not a hollow stance: he fully intended not only to defy his President’s call for help, but arm himself and his fellow secessionists with weapons and ammunition from the Confederate government.

St. Louis became the center of attention in Missouri, partly because of its federal arsenal. The largest arsenal west of the Mississippi River, approximately 36,000 muskets were stored there.10 Incredibly, this invaluable military resource, located in a divided state, was lightly defended. The garrison was increased when Captain Nathaniel Lyon arrived with eighty infantrymen on February 7, 1861. Recent service in Kansas increased Lyon’s hatred of slavery and secessionists, and he eagerly waited for a chance to strike a blow against them.11

With the support of U.S. Congressman Frank Blair, Lyon became an increasingly powerful figure in Missouri. Blair and Lyon realized still more troops were needed to ensure the St. Louis arsenal did not fall to the secessionists. Thus, they requested permission from Washington to raise their own volunteer regiments. Although President Lincoln endorsed the request on April 30, Lyon’s federal volunteers were not approved by Congress, and the regiments became a violation of the U.S. Constitution. Of course this action was necessary because Jackson refused to comply with Lincoln’s constitutional request of April 15. Regardless of the legal issues, Lyon and Blair immediately set to work enrolling the loyal men of St. Louis. Within a few weeks, thousands of men, mostly Germans, had joined the new units.12

Meanwhile, Governor Jackson worked covertly to get Missouri into the Confederacy, while publically proclaiming neutrality. The stakes were high and the threats real, and both sides worked for the best possible advantage. Tensions were heightened in St. Louis when Jackson ordered the Volunteer Militia of Missouri to train for six days in May. Separate from the militia authorized by the constitution, this was a strictly volunteer force. Many of the companies had seen service along the Missouri/Kansas border in the 1850s. Units from the First Military District (St. Louis city and county) gathered at Lindell Grove, on the outskirts of St. Louis where they named their encampment in honor of the governor. The militia and Jackson’s training order were completely legal, though Camp Jackson was not a gathering of Union men. Confederate flags were proudly displayed along the company streets, and three cannons, courtesy of the Confederate government, were delivered in crates labeled “marble.”13

Despite the show of force, the militia at Camp Jackson posed no threat to the arsenal. Since his arrival in St. Louis, Lyon recruited Union volunteers, strengthened the arsenal’s defenses, and moved the extra weapons to Illinois.14 They were however, openly defiant and advocating secession. Scheduled to break camp on May 11, Lyon could have let the militiamen return to their homes peacefully. But Lyon came to St. Louis eager to teach secessionists a lesson and could not pass up this opportunity.15 Lyon marched his command of 6,500 men to Lindell Grove on the morning of May 10. His force easily surrounded Camp Jackson and demanded its surrender. Resistance of course was futile, and General Daniel Frost surrendered 669 militiamen to Lyon.16

While success for Lyon was certain, incarceration of the prisoners was another matter. Unable to keep them, Lyon’s only option was to administer an oath of allegiance and send them home. This could easily have been done at Lindell Grove, but Lyon was convinced a more dramatic step was necessary. Unfortunately, he chose to march his prisoners back to the arsenal where they could take the oath. By this time an angry mob had gathered along the route. Many of these St. Louis citizens had shouted insults at the German soldiers as they marched to Lindell Grove. Now that the Germans had taken the militiamen prisoner, the crowd hurled rocks and bottles, along with more insults. Some citizens fired pistol shots as well. Apparently trying to disperse the onlookers, Lyon’s men fired a volley well above their heads. This failed to restore order and the nervous Germans turned their muskets on the crowd. Twenty-eight civilians were killed, another seventy-five wounded in the melee. Two Union soldiers and three militiamen also died.17

St. Louis was thrown into a panic. Tensions were high in the city for days as armed men walked the streets and many citizens feared the Germans would go on a murderous rampage.18 Although surely regretting the lives lost, this was precisely the moment Governor Jackson had been waiting for. Jackson left St. Louis immediately for Jefferson City, where the legislature was debating a military bill that would prepare Missouri for war. The bill had encountered heavy opposition, but news of Camp Jackson broke the legislative standoff and it passed in fifteen minutes. The legislature even gave Jackson control of the state’s railroads and telegraphs. It also reorganized the state militia into the Missouri State Guard. Sterling Price, a former governor and president of the secession convention took command of the new force. Initially only allied with Confederate troops, the State Guard was the nucleus for Missouri’s recruitment of formal Confederate regiments in early 1862.19

Lyon has been a controversial figure since he first arrived in St. Louis. Admired as the man who saved Missouri for the Union, he is also reviled as the man who triggered a civil war in Missouri. Though partly true, both interpretations are exaggerated. If it was ever in doubt, the Camp Jackson Massacre assured Union control of St. Louis. Before May 10, secession was a topic for public debate. Fearing Union reprisals, Southern sympathizers kept their allegiance quiet after Camp Jackson. Ironically, Camp Jackson’s greatest impact was most likely felt outside St. Louis. Free from the watchful eyes of Union soldiers, some Missourians were galvanized against Lyon and the oppressive Union tactics. Recruits eagerly joined the State Guard, and Lyon surely created many Rebels. In this sense, as one historian wrote, Camp Jackson was truly a “colossal blunder” for the Union cause.20

Blair and Lyon, like most Americans in 1861, certainly expected a short war. They acted decisively to eliminate a threat, regardless how serious it was. Few people could have predicted four years of bloodshed and the terror of guerrilla war in Missouri. Missouri’s strategic location and resources were essential to Union victory and Lyon helped secure them for the Northern cause. This became an important Union advantage as the short war of 1861 turned into a long, bloody struggle. There is no reason to believe Missouri could have remained neutral throughout the war, even if Nathaniel Lyon had never came to St. Louis. Missourians had to choose between the Union and the Confederacy; Lyon just forced them to make that decision sooner.21

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1. Christopher Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate: Claiborne Fox Jackson and the Creation of Southern Identity in the Border West (Columbia: University of Missouri, 2000), 28.
2. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 48.
3. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 116.
4. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 118.
5. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 133.
6. William E. Parrish, A History of Missouri Volume III 1860 to 1875 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 4.
7. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 239-40.
8. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 241-43.
9. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 245.
10. Randy R. McGuire, “Solving The Mystery of the Arsenal Guns,” http://www.civilwarstlouis.com/arsenal/index.htm
11. Christopher Phillips, Damned Yankee: The Life of General Nathaniel Lyon (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990), 127-30.
12. William Garrett Piston and Richard W. Hatcher III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 28, 31, 33-34; Phillips, Damned Yankee, 163-64; Louis S. Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas), 94-96, 116.
13. U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, Volume 3, 4; Piston and Hatcher, Wilson’s Creek, 32-33.
14. Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis, 85-87, 91-92, 95, 110.
15. Piston and Hatcher, Wilson’s Creek, 33; Phillips, Damned Yankee, 178-80.
16. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 251.
17. Piston and Hatcher, Wilson’s Creek, 36; Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis, 104-110.
18. Phillips, Damned Yankee, 192-93.
19. Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate, 252-53; Piston and Hatcher, Wilson’s Creek, 36-37.
20. Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis, 114-15; Phillips, Damned Yankee, 198; William E. Parrish, Frank Blair: Lincoln’s Conservative (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998), 102.
21. Piston and Hatcher, Wilson’s Creek, 37; Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 22.